Marshall argued that the fire ineffectiveness of infantry stemmed from their general misperception of what to expect on the battlefield. Their training, reinforced by movies and books, guide them to expect a battlefield crowded with men and machinery. Instead, however, when they reached the breast lines what they found was an emptiness where they did not see the enemy, and soon ferocious out of contact with their comrades as well. The individual rifleman found himself in effect alone, with no obvious live target to shoot at and no strong impression of support from his own unit. In this environment, the typical rifleman did not so much "freeze" as feel lost; the result was still a neediness of effective action.
Marshall gave a typical example of the hassle as encountered during island fighting in the Pacific (129-131). A bout line would be moving forward when a some hostile rounds forced it to "hit the dirt." The moment it did, however, its forward neural impulse was completely lost.
On the rough ground, each soldier was obscure from his fellows; with unit cohesion temporarily gone, no individual infantryman was likely to start moving on his own, and officers had great impediment restoring the movement. One
More generally, Marshall identifies vi qualities which are critical in the small-unit commander (163-164):
With its firm revolve about on the real problems facing the infantry soldier and tactical commander in actual fire situations, this book is especially valuable reading for officers and future officers.
Courage, creative intelligence, and physical fitness.
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